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Abstract This is the report on the Workshop on Flow-Based Network Man-
agement, held within the 37th IRTF NMRG meeting, during IETF 93, on 24th
July 2015, in Prague, Czech Republic. Following the tradition of the IRTF
NMRG, the workshop focused on technologies, developments, and challenges
of using flow-level traffic measurements for network management.
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1 Introduction
Flow-based approaches are used in various areas of network management to-
day, such as link monitoring, accounting, and security. It is a tradition for the
IRTF NMRG (Network Management Research Group) to organize a day work-
shop focusing on flow-based network management, with the goal to provide
a forum for academia and industry to present and discuss the latest develop-
ments and experiences in this area. Previous editions of the NMRG workshop
have had their reports also published within this journal. In 2009 [5], the work-
shop brought up discussions on technologies to capture and analyze flow data,
and on the effects of sampling and aggregation strategies on the accuracy of
results. In 2011 [2], the workshop raised discussions on the standardization
of the IPFIX protocol and challenges on its adoption, potential applications
of NetFlow/IPFIX, and how NetFlow/IPFIX was being used in practice. The
workshop organizers also initiated a special issue on recent advances and future
trends in flow-based approaches [7].
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Differently from previous editions, which focused only on NetFlow/IPFIX,
in this edition of the workshop we have broadened the workshop scope to also
include other flow-based technologies that allow for traffic measurements, such
as OpenFlow and other technologies and strategies introduced with Software-
Defined Networking (SDN). In total, 32 people attended the workshop, which
was composed of 9 presentations. This report is a summary of the presentations
along with their main conclusions, addressing the following topics:
– Developments on flow-based measurements for constrained devices, very
high-speed links, and storage and processing of large amounts of flow data.
– Usage of flows in network security.
– Flows measurement in OpenFlow-enabled networks.
The slides from the presentations are publicly available at the repository
website of the IETF 93 meeting1.
2 Challenges of flow-level traffic measurements
2.1 TinyIPFIX for WSN
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) have been widely researched and deployed
in the context of large scale distributed measurements. Typically, WSNs are
composed by a large number of smart meters locally gathering data on their
surrounding environment, and sending the data to a centralized location for
further processing. These smart meters are resource limited (i.e., low-cost and
low-power hardware) and demand for efficient communication protocols to
transmit metering data. A push-based protocol is, therefore, the most suitable
solution.
IPFIX [6] has been developed based on the successful Cisco NetFlow for
traffic flow measurements. IPFIX is an IETF standard and defines a push
protocol with template-based design. However, IPFIX as proposed is not a
suitable protocol for using within WSNs due to the overhead of additional
headers (i.e., 20 Bytes extra). Moreover, sensors have limitations on the max-
imum transmission unit of 102 bytes from the IEEE 802.15.4 standard.
TinyIPFIX, proposed by Corina Schmitt and Burkhard Stiller from the
University of Zu¨rich, uses compression techniques to reduce the overhead of
traditional IPFIX. In its aggressive compression mode, TinyIPFIX can reduce
85% of the IPFIX overhead, from 20 to 3 bytes. TinyIPFIX is currently imple-
mented for TinyOS and it has been successfully deployed in multiple sensors,
namely the IRIS sensors from Crossbow Inc., the TelosB from Advantic Sys.,
and the OPAL from APDM Wearable Tech.
1 https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/93/materials.html
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2.2 Software-Defined Monitoring
We have been seeing that network monitoring is shifting to application layer
(i.e., L7) processing. We have also been seeing the ever increasing traffic de-
mands and the recent deployments of 100 Gbps networks. The CPUs of com-
modity multi-core platforms are limited to process few thousands of packets
per second (basic NetFlow monitoring) and statistics are computed up to
transport layer (TCP and UDP). Processing of application layer information,
however, is more complex and demands more resources. A complete hardware-
based implementation of monitoring (if possible, because it is still under re-
search) would lack flexibility.
Software Defined Monitoring (SDM), initially proposed in [3] and here
presented by Luka´sˇ Kekely, Viktor Pusˇ and Jan Koeˇnek from CESNET, is a
trade-off between software and hardware monitoring. Although SDM borrows
the general idea of the uprising Software-Defined Networking (SDN) paradigm,
these two do not overlap. Roughly, SDM is implemented in two modules,
namely the firmware and the software modules. The first packet of a unknown
flow is sent by the firmware to the SDM software, which will then decide
how the monitoring for that specific flow will be performed. If the flow is of
interest and further processing is needed on the flow packets, the firmware
will be required to send all matching packets to the SDM software. Otherwise,
basic flow accounting for that flow will happen in hardware.
The SDM monitoring system uses the FPGA card (Field Programmable
Gate Array – SDM firmware) to offload and accelerate the processing of the
bulk traffic, while a commodity multi-core CPU (SDM software) performs the
detailed analysis of application layer headers for the traffic of interest. By
combining CPU and software plugins with FPGA processing, SDM is able to
achieve software-like flexibility on monitoring traffic with the performance of
a dedicated hardware box.
2.3 Data storage and processing using big data
Monitoring high-speed networks generates a massive amount of flow data.
For example, at CESNET’s network (Czech Republic’s NREN) approximately
250 GB of flow data is monitored per day. The storage and post-processing
(i.e., interactive manipulation) of such amount of data is a challenging task.
This problem aggravates when using the monitored flow data for, e.g., security
operations that require fast data retrieval with low latency. One potential
solution is to use open-source platforms for big data processing. However, these
open-source platforms present certain limitations due to the specific format of
flow data.
Experiments on using big data solutions for flow processing have been done
by Martin Zˇadn´ık, from CESNET (presented by Viktor Pusˇ). These experi-
ments used a Hadoop cluster of 24 slaves and 3 master nodes with 128 GB
RAM each and total disk capacity of 1 PB. A comparison using simple queries
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showed that MapReduce operations in text (CSV) and binary formats, and
queries in Hive (a SQL interface into Hadoop) were meaningfully faster than
those made in Pig (a functional interface that stores data in CSV format). Ver-
tica, a column-based database, has also been tested. Using a cluster of 3 nodes
with 4 GB RAM each, queries were performed significantly faster with Vertica.
3 Flow measurements for network security
3.1 Botnet detection
Botnets are a significant threat to the security and integrity of the Internet.
They provide an infrastructure for various kinds of attacks, either directed
against the users of the infected Bot machines (e.g., data theft) or against
other parties (e.g., SPAM or Distributed DoS attacks). In a botnet, the infected
hosts are under the command of a bot master that communicates with them
through one or more command-and-control servers.
In his presentation, speaker Christian Dietz from the Universita¨t der Bun-
deswehr Mu¨nchen identified, among others, heterogeneous environments as
an important challenge toward the successful detection of botnets from flow
data. Standardized and normalized descriptors for attack behavior and mea-
surement noise are needed, so that descriptors can be stored and exchanged
among involved parties in a heterogeneous environment.
As an example, a normalized descriptor of the temporal network behavior
of a bot is proposed. The normalization allows to exchange the descriptor be-
tween the local intrusion detection systems of cooperative heterogeneous net-
works. If appropriately implemented, efficient algorithms (such as K-nearest,
Bloom filters, etc.) would enable local detection systems to efficiently search
the shared data for behavior similar to their observations.
3.2 Fingerprinting and classification
Christian Hammerschmidt from the University of Luxemburg gave a presen-
tation on the usage of Automaton models for fingerprinting and classification
of flow data. In his work in progress, he proposes to learn finite state machines
from NetFlow data. The resulting machines describe the sequence of observed
flow data in a network and can be used to predict the statistics of the next
flows or to classify flows for activity or intrusion identification. When seeing
NetFlow data as a (regular) language to be produced by an automaton, one
challenge is the large state-space, which has to be reduced by clustering to
obtain few representatives or by discretization (binning).
Initial results from experiments with time-aggregated flow data look promis-
ing. Future research will comprise a comparison of the performance of the
approach with other fingerprinting solutions and the application of more ex-
pressive automaton models, such as state machines that specify symbol prob-
abilities.
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3.3 Distributed anomaly detection
In a small network, network-based anomaly detection can be achieved by mon-
itoring network traffic at one single point of observation, e.g., a router. How-
ever, such a simple approach is not possible anymore for large networks with
multiple ingress points, where monitoring at one of those points only pro-
vides a partial view of the network. Researchers have proposed different IDS
(Intrusion Detection System) designs to handle the latter scenario [1]. In a
centralized design, all observation points send their data to a central point
where analysis and intrusion detection is performed. In a distributed design,
multiple local detection systems are deployed next to the observations points.
Those local systems communicate with other systems or with a central server.
The presentation by Carlos Garc´ıa Cordero (TU Darmstadt) on joint work
with Andreas Vo¨st and Jochen Ko¨gel (IsarNet) addresses the problem of learn-
ing in a distributed system. In an anomaly-based IDS, the goal of learning is to
produce a normality model that can be used to detect anomalous behavior. In
order to avoid centralized learning (which would require to collect all data at
a central point), the authors successfully follow a distributed approach where
each local system learns its model independently from the other local systems.
The result is a set of models that can be used to create ensembles of learners.
The authors are also interested in techniques to merge the individually learned
models into a single global model without the overhead of centralized learning.
Although such techniques exist, they are model and learner specific.
3.4 IPv6 security landscape
With the increasing adoption of IPv6 within networks and the Internet, and
the eventual replacement of IPv4 in the long term, security research in the
area of IPv6 is a necessity. While many theoritical works have pointed out
weaknesses and vulnerabilities in IPv6 on both LAN and WAN scale, real-
world measurements have been limited to observing traffic reaching dark-nets
(i.e., address space that is advertized and routed, but does not contain any real
hosts). This approach enables easy classification of malign traffic (as everything
reaching the dark-net can be considered malicious), but the amount of traffic
is low as there are no hosts to be a target of interest. Luuk Hendriks from the
University of Twente aims at analyzing IPv6 traffic in production networks
that have been IPv6-enabled for several years, e.g., NREN and university
networks, to determine which threats are actually active in the wild.
The main goal of this research is determining to what extent new security
measures are a necessity, or whether approaches from the IPv4 era suffice.
With the growing number of devices connected to the Internet, including non-
traditional machines (i.e. the Internet of Things), we can not rely on threat
detection on end hosts. Flow-based solutions enables for scalable approaches,
to observe entire networks from a single vantage point. Leveraging this allows
for analysis on a large scale and creating a realistic view of the threats active on
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networks. Attack tool suites are analyzed for flow-level characteristics, forming
the bases of detection algorithms for these threats.
Threats that focus on the application layer of the OSI model are likely to
occur in an IPv6 network, and approaches to counter these threats will be very
similar to those of IPv4 networks. The network layer itself is where new con-
cepts are introduced, and therefore the more interesting area of research. To
do flow-based analysis, the use of IPFIX and the possibility of custom Infor-
mation Elements is vital, enabling to include new protocol fields in detection
algorithms. The actual measurements will be performed by distributing a piece
of open source software, performing detection based on flow-based input, and
creating privacy preserving reports on which classes of threats are observed.
This provides scalable detection for the networks of the vantage point, and
over time give an overview of the status of security in an IPv6 Internet.
4 Flow-level traffic measurements in OpenFlow-enabled networks
4.1 Monitoring, visualization and configuration of OpenFlow-based SDN
While the SDN paradigm reduces, or in some cases eliminates, traditional net-
work management problems, it comes with new challenges. The introduction
of the controller concept is an example of that: while enabling network opera-
tors to do configuration using high level languages, the necessary communica-
tion between the controller and the forwarding devices introduces previously
non-existing resource consumption and possible effects on the forwarding per-
formance. Pedro Heleno Isolani (UFRGS) quantified the overheads imposed
by OpenFlow messages on the control channel, and furthermore proposes an
interactive approach to SDN management based on monitoring, visualization
and configuration.
Using Mininet, a network composed of 230 hosts, 11 switches, 2 content
servers and 1 controller was emulated, and both the control channel load and
the resource usage were analyzed. This showed that 99.70% of the control
traffic could be ascribed to the four OpenFlow messages for Modify-State (to
add or modify flow tables entries), Read-State (to retrieve statistics from the
switch), Send-Packet (to send packets to a specific swith port) and Packet-In
(to send unmatched packets from the switch to the controller). Furthermore,
a clear relation between controller channel load and the configured idle time-
outs was observed. Longer timeout values cause more control channel load,
as responses to statistics request contain information for a greater number of
flow entries. In addition, longer timeout values result in less messages of types
Modify-State and Packet-In.
The second (and partly based on the former) contribution of this research
was the proposal of an SDN management approach composed of monitoring,
visualization and configuration managers. Besides the architectural overview
a prototype GUI was presented, showing interactive graphs visualising con-
trol channel loads, network topologies and configuration parameters, among
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other information. The researchers emphasize the fact that implementations
of control channel handlers differ and that standardisation of interfaces for
all layers, i.e. forwarding devices, controllers and applications, may foster the
development of SDN-based solutions.
4.2 Flow-based management in NFV
Within the Network Function Virtualization Research Group (NFVRG) an
open discussion is ongoing, trying to address challenges in flow-based network
management. The draft related to this, draft-unify-nfvrg-devops [4], con-
tains implications which were presented and explained by Catalin Meirosu
from Ericsson Research. This document describes a set of principals relevant
from a DevOps perspective in managing SDN infrastructures, and also the
challenges that come with it such as development of tools, interfaces and pro-
tocols. Catalin, active in the UNIFY project, specifically focussed on two chal-
lenge areas in his presentation, namely challenges of stability, and observability,
in SDN infrastructures.
As controllers and agents in such an SDN infrastructure have limited ca-
pacity to process flow requests, admission of flows is not always possible in a
pro-active way. Furthermore, every flow has similar overhead, whether it is a
big (elephant) or small (mice) flow, eliminating any possible gain otherwise
obtained via prioritizing one or the other. Ultimately, flow table congestion can
occur, naturally affecting the stability of the network. Using aggregat d flows
(using wildcards in the OpenFlow matching fields) will increase scalability, at
the cost of visibility. This directly affects the observability: while monitoring
aggregated flows for a subnet and observing e.g. packet loss, it is impossible to
derive between which two individual hosts this packet loss actually occurred.
A possible solution in the draft uses more complex flow entries in the flow table
on the ingress node, to select a more granular sub-flow from the aggregated
flow.
Another challenge is the interaction between the routing application and
the monitoring application on the controller. To serve sound information, the
monitoring application needs to receive context information from the rout-
ing app, e.g., path changes in the network. The routing application uses that
information again to decide what path changes to apply. Such a solution em-
phasizes the need for a consistent deployment, where every forwarding device is
able to provide the statistics needed by the monitoring application. The draft
proposes monitoring annotations in order to forward graph information to the
controller, using separate probes proving the necessary information. Placement
of these probes and their update frequencies form another topic of research,
as are the specific measurements they should provide. The draft describes ex-
amples for statistical counters, i.e., mean and variance values, providing more
insight than traditional, simple counter values.
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5 Summary
The IRTF NMRG Workshop series has been considered a valuable place to dis-
cuss new ideas and recent advances on flow-level traffic measurements. Unlike
previous editions of the workshop that focused on NetFlow/IPFIX technolo-
gies, in this edition the scope of the program has been widened to other flow-
based approaches for network management. We have seen, therefore, presen-
tations ranging from the use of IPFIX in the constrained networking scenarios
of WSN, to security-related solutions using flows, and to the most recent SDN
and OpenFlow technologies. This edition of the workshop enabled remark-
able discussions and interactions between people already engaged in the IRTF
NMRG and also first-time comers. All the presentations are available at the
website of the IETF 93 meeting.
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